Malicious Wscript Executing Temp File as JavaScript (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript or cscript invoking the JavaScript engine against a file with a tmp extension, the execution behavior of a Konni AsyncRAT chain that runs 83972.tmp as JavaScript from ProgramData. Adversaries leverage the engine override switch to run script content from a mismatched temp extension while evading extension based controls, making early detection critical for surfacing the scripting stage before further payload execution.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.