Malicious Zloader C2 Communication Over HTTP

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-30
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the Zloader command-and-control gate path milagrecf.php observed in the attempted attack against Intel 471. The fixed PHP gate receives beacons from the loader after the malicious Excel 4.0 macro executes. The hardcoded C2 path identifies compromised hosts contacting the operator regardless of the C2 host.

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Malicious Zloader C2 Communication Over HTTP
Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.