Masquerading Execution of Binary from Var Log Directory (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of an executable located under the var log directory on Linux, the persistence staging behavior of the Kimsuky Gomir variant which copies its binary to var log rsyslogd and runs it through a systemd service. Adversaries leverage a log directory that normally holds only text logs to hide an executable while masquerading as the rsyslog daemon, making early detection critical for surfacing the implant before it beacons.

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Masquerading Execution of Binary from Var Log Directory (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1543.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.