Masquerading Kimsuky Scheduled Task Persistence Executing VBE via Wscript (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-01
Updated
2026-09-01

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a scheduled task that repeatedly launches wscript.exe against a VBScript encoded file, the persistence behavior used by a Kimsuky campaign to keep its bot.vbe beacon running at short intervals. Adversaries leverage the Task Scheduler to survive reboots and maintain access while masquerading as a browser update task, making early detection critical for surfacing persistence before further payload deployment.

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Suspicious Scheduled Task Masquerading as Palo Alto Cortex Services
Malicious Scheduled Task Running rundll32 w32analytics (via process_creation)
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Masquerading Kimsuky Scheduled Task Persistence Executing VBE via Wscript (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.