Mirai and Rondo Payload Retrieval via Known Loader Paths

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound web requests to loader paths used to distribute Mirai binaries and the Rondo cryptominer. These retrievals follow CVE-2025-55182 exploitation of IoT and smart home devices.

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Suspicious WebDAV Retrieval via rundll32 and davclnt.dll (via process_creation)
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Mirai and Rondo Payload Retrieval via Known Loader Paths
Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.