OpenClaw Loader Execution via LuaJIT Interpreter Running Text Payload (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-06
Updated
2026-11-06

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a bundled LuaJIT interpreter named unc.exe, lua.exe, or luajit.exe executing one of the OpenClaw text payloads license.txt, base.txt, cdef.txt, or clib.txt. The OpenClaw lure factory launches these interpreters from a batch file to run a large text-based Lua payload that beacons to a screenshot-stealing C2, making the interpreter and text-payload pairing a strong loader signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1059 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Git Config sshCommand Modification for Code Execution on Linux
Suspicious React2Shell Cryptominer Masquerade and Crond Persistence on Linux
Suspicious Reconnaissance Commands Spawned by Node.js Runtime on Linux
Suspicious Amazon Q Developer CLI Invocation With Trust All Tools Flag
Suspicious AI CLI Invoked With Permission Bypass Flags (s1ngularity Aftermath)
Suspicious Selenium Grid Binary Location RCE via Python Interpreter on Linux
Suspicious ECS ExecuteCommand Lateral Movement via SSM in AWS CloudTrail (via cloudtrail)
Possible Ivanti EPMM Unauthenticated RCE via featureusage Expression Language Injection (via webserver)
Malicious Python pth Site Hook Written via FortiWeb Fabric Connector SQL Injection (via file_event)
OpenClaw Loader Execution via LuaJIT Interpreter Running Text Payload (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.