Possible CI Runner Memory Scraping via Python Process Memory Read (tj-actions Supply Chain)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Python interpreter reading another process memory through /proc maps and mem, the technique the compromised tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action used to dump CI runner memory. It is important because this behavior harvests secrets and tokens from the runner and leaks them into build logs.

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Possible CI Runner Memory Scraping via Python Process Memory Read (tj-actions Supply Chain)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.