Possible Credential Stuffing Blocked by Conditional Access in Microsoft 365

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. Exfiltration

  8. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events blocked by Conditional Access after a valid password was supplied, which can indicate credential stuffing or password spraying against accounts protected only by MFA. Huntress observed adversaries validating stolen credentials from VPN, Tor, and proxy sources before attempting session takeover. A spike of these blocks from anomalous geographies surfaces pre-MFA account compromise that would otherwise be silent.

Related detections9 linkedT1090 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Suspicious Azure OpenAI Model Enumeration and Deployment Creation (via azure)
Suspicious Azure Cognitive Services Account Key Enumeration via ListKeys (via azure)
Malicious Business Email Compromise OAuth Application Sign-In via Entra ID Service Principal (via azure)
Suspicious AWS API Call from TruffleHog Credential Scanner User Agent
Malicious GenAI Browser Extension C2 and PAC Redirection (via proxy)
Malicious FRP Reverse Proxy Tunnel Identified by Hardcoded Token (via process_creation)
Suspicious SSH Reverse Tunnel Over DNS Port
Suspicious Chisel SOCKS Tunnel Command Line
Possible Credential Stuffing Blocked by Conditional Access in Microsoft 365
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.