Possible EndRAT C2 Communication via Distinctive Client Identifier

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
network_connection
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects network traffic containing the EndRAT-specific identifiers endServer9688 or endClient9688, string markers observed in Operation Poseidon where the AutoIt-delivered EndRAT implant used these tokens to communicate with its command-and-control server. It captures the beaconing of a specific remote-access trojan by its protocol constants. Detecting this is important because these identifiers are unique to the malware family and provide a high-confidence signal of active compromise.

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Possible EndRAT C2 Communication via Distinctive Client Identifier
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.