Possible FluBot C2 Polling via Known Malware URI Paths

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the short polling endpoints used by the FluBot Android banking malware to reach its command-and-control server. Repeated beaconing to these fixed URI paths indicates an infected device polling for tasks and reporting stolen data.

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Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.