Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Discovery

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a user or admin consent grant to an OAuth service principal, a technique used in the illicit consent grant attacks documented by Huntress. Adversaries lure victims into consenting to attacker-controlled applications to obtain long-lived access tokens for mail and directory data. Because legitimate app consent is common, this detection is best paired with anomalous application naming or reply URLs and treated as a hunting lead.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Context.ai OAuth Application Authorization by Client ID (via google_workspace)
Malicious Azure AD Application Consent Granted with Mail Permissions
Malicious PRT Token Forging via AADInternals (via ps_script)
Suspicious Entra Device Code Authentication with Office Client and Automated User Agent
Suspicious AWS SSO Token Creation and Role Credential Retrieval (via cloudtrail)
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent or Permission Grant (via auditlogs)
Malicious Context.ai OAuth Service Principal by App Owner Organization (via azure)
Suspicious Entra ID ROPC Authentication Bypassing MFA
Suspicious Consent to Application Grant in Entra ID
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.