Possible Local Group Membership Enumeration via Security Event 4798

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-20
Updated
2026-09-20

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Windows Security event 4798 recording enumeration of a user local group membership, generated by the net user Beacon Object File used during Cobalt Strike post-exploitation reconnaissance. Attackers enumerate account and group membership to plan privilege escalation and lateral movement. A high volume or unusual source of these events can indicate automated discovery activity.

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Possible Local Group Membership Enumeration via Security Event 4798
Pivot detection · T1087 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.