Possible MOVEit Transfer Exploitation via MOVEitISAPI action m2 and X-siLock Headers

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests to MOVEitISAPI.dll with action=m2 that also carry X-siLock control headers, matching the MOVEit Transfer RCE chain analyzed by Assetnote for CVE-2023-34362. The X-siLock headers drive internal session-variable manipulation used in the SQL injection to RCE path. Detecting this handler and header pairing surfaces active exploitation of the MOVEit ISAPI extension.

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Possible MOVEit Transfer Exploitation via MOVEitISAPI action m2 and X-siLock Headers
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.