Possible Pass-the-Hash NTLM Network Logon (via security)

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1550.002Pass the Hash
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1550.002Pass the Hash
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects network logons using the NTLM authentication package in Event ID 4624 with logon type 3, the pattern left behind by pass-the-hash lateral movement. Attackers reuse stolen NTLM hashes to authenticate to remote hosts without knowing the plaintext password. Hash reuse enables lateral movement and access to additional systems while blending with normal NTLM traffic.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1550.002 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Credential Dumping via Mimikatz Sekurlsa Commands

Possible Token Manipulation via NewCredentials Logon Type 9

Suspicious Registry Modification Disabling RestrictedAdmin Mode (via process_creation)

Suspicious Lateral Movement via Invoke-WMIExec or Invoke-SMBExec (via ps_script)

Windows LsaSrv Events Indicating NTLMv1 Logon Between Client and Server

Windows Pass-the-Hash Activity via Security Event 4624 (LogonType 3 or 9)

Windows NTLM authentication events (Event ID 8002)

Windows Successful Logon Type 9 (NewCredentials) Matching Overpass-the-Hash

Windows Security: Detects RULER workstation using NTLM and login events (Event IDs 4776, 4624/4625)

Possible Pass-the-Hash NTLM Network Logon (via security)

Pivot detection · T1550.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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