Possible Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Abuse for Remote Access

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-24
Updated
2026-10-24

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of remote monitoring and management tools including AnyDesk TeamViewer and NetSupport client32 that adversaries such as Storm-1811 abuse to gain hands on keyboard access after social engineering. These tools are legitimate but are frequently deployed by intruders to maintain interactive control of victim hosts. Detecting their execution supports baselining and hunting for unsanctioned remote access.

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Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious PowerShell Download Cradle Spawned by Quick Assist
Suspicious AnyDesk Unattended Password Set via Piped Echo
Suspicious Remote Monitoring Tool Executing from GoAnywhere Directory
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Client Spawning PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious Peach Sandstorm Remote Access via AnyDesk Tooling (via process_creation)
Possible Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Abuse for Remote Access
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.