Possible Shadow Credentials Abuse via msDS-KeyCredentialLink Modification

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-01
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute on a directory object. Adversaries write key credentials to this attribute to perform certificate-based authentication as the target account, a technique known as Shadow Credentials used for persistence and credential theft.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious AWS SAML Identity Provider Creation
Suspicious Okta Sign-On Policy Lifecycle Modification
Azure Audit Logs: User registered security info (authentication method change)
Suspicious Login Shell Assigned to Service Account games on Linux
Suspicious NTLM Network Logon From Attacker Controlled Workstation Names (via security)
Suspicious dMSA Object Access with Migration AccessMask
Windows HackTool Execution: GoldenDMSA.exe Launch with Directory Manipulation Parameters
Suspicious Compute Instance Metadata Modification in GCP
Suspicious Azure AD Authentication Method Registration for Account Takeover (via azure)
Possible Shadow Credentials Abuse via msDS-KeyCredentialLink Modification
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.