Possible TrickBot Anchor DNS C2 Registration via HTTP URI (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command and control traffic from the Anchor DNS variant of TrickBot which prefixes its registration and task URIs with the /anchor_dns/ path. The bot embeds the victim hostname and hardware identifier within this path during check in. The literal /anchor_dns/ marker is a strong indicator of Anchor activity.

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Possible TrickBot Anchor DNS C2 Registration via HTTP URI (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.