PowerShell Proxy Execution via SyncAppvPublishingServer (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-03
Updated
2026-09-03

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects SyncAppvPublishingServer being used to smuggle a PowerShell command through its argument, a signed-binary proxy technique that runs script code while masking the parent as a trusted App-V component. SyncAppvPublishingServer abuse is a defense-evasion technique tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting this pattern surfaces script execution hidden behind a signed binary.

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Windows: Uncommon Child Processes Spawned by sigverif.exe
Windows: Suspicious CustomShellHost.exe execution spawned by non-Explorer parent
PowerShell: Signed UtilityFunctions.ps1 Loading Managed DLL via Proxy Execution
Windows PowerShell Script Proxy Execution via CL_mutexverifiers.ps1
PowerShell Assembly Loading via CL_LoadAssembly.ps1 Functions
Windows Process Execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs with Inline PowerShell Commands
PowerShell Proxy Execution via SyncAppvPublishingServer (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1216 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.