Renamed Qbot Loader Execution via rundll32 Running DAT File with xlAutoOpen Export (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-23
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe invoking a .dat file through the xlAutoOpen export, the execution behavior a Qbot XLL phishing chain uses to run its decrypted loader before injecting into wermgr.exe. Adversaries reuse the Excel add-in entry point from a renamed DLL to launch the banking trojan under a trusted binary, making early detection critical for stopping the intrusion at the loader stage.

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Renamed Qbot Loader Execution via rundll32 Running DAT File with xlAutoOpen Export (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.