Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-02
Updated
2026-09-02

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects regsvr32 or rundll32 loading a module that carries a disguised or non-standard extension such as .dat, .tmp, .png or .log from a user-writable directory, a masquerading pattern used by loaders like Qbot to hide their DLL payload. Proxy execution of renamed DLLs is documented in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report as a way to defeat extension-based controls. Detecting these disguised module loads surfaces the payload execution.

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IMEEX Framework DLL Execution via Rundll32 Loading imaadp (via process_creation)
Suspicious Persistence via pcalua Launching rundll32 Control_RunDLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Executing DLL Start Export With Control Flags
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution of Timestamp-Named DLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL from LocalAppData with Short Export (via process_creation)
Malicious Word Spawning Rundll32 Loading DLL from Roaming Word Folder
Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.