Windows Application: ScreenConnect RMM File Transfer Activity (Event 201)
Flags ScreenConnect RMM file transfer events on Windows based on provider name, Event ID 201, and transfer action text.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- application
- Author
- Ali Alwashali (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-10-10
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies file transfer activity initiated or handled through ScreenConnect on Windows by matching an application event where the provider is ScreenConnect and the event indicates a file transfer action. Attackers can use ScreenConnect for stealthy remote administration, including moving files to support payload staging or data movement. Detection relies on Windows application telemetry containing the provider name and the specific event text indicating “Transferred files with action.”
Reporting behind it
- huntandhackett.comhttps://www.huntandhackett.com/blog/revil-the-usage-of-legitimate-remote-admin-tooling
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/screenconnect/win_app_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_file_transfer.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Application: ScreenConnect RMM File Transfer Activity (Event 201)"
id: ceb66950-2882-408b-82d5-8c7e6cd0f22a
related:
- id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23
type: similar
- id: 5d19eb78-5b5b-4ef2-a9f0-4bfa94d58a13
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies file transfer activity initiated or handled through ScreenConnect on Windows by matching an application event where the provider is ScreenConnect and the event indicates a file transfer action. Attackers can use ScreenConnect for stealthy remote administration, including moving files to support payload staging or data movement. Detection relies on Windows application telemetry containing the provider name and the specific event text indicating “Transferred files with action.”
references:
- https://www.huntandhackett.com/blog/revil-the-usage-of-legitimate-remote-admin-tooling
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/screenconnect/win_app_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_file_transfer.yml
author: Ali Alwashali, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-10-10
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
service: application
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: ScreenConnect
EventID: 201
Data|contains: Transferred files with action
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of ScreenConnect
level: low
license: DRL-1.1