Windows Application: ScreenConnect RMM File Transfer Activity (Event 201)

Flags ScreenConnect RMM file transfer events on Windows based on provider name, Event ID 201, and transfer action text.

FreeReviewedSigma · Low · v2

Product: windows
Service: application
Author: Ali Alwashali (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2023-10-10
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies file transfer activity initiated or handled through ScreenConnect on Windows by matching an application event where the provider is ScreenConnect and the event indicates a file transfer action. Attackers can use ScreenConnect for stealthy remote administration, including moving files to support payload staging or data movement. Detection relies on Windows application telemetry containing the provider name and the specific event text indicating “Transferred files with action.”

Reporting behind it

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Windows Application: ScreenConnect RMM File Transfer Activity (Event 201)

Pivot detection · T1059.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

screenconnect-rmm-file-transfer-activity-on-windows-event-id-201-5d19eb78

title: "Windows Application: ScreenConnect RMM File Transfer Activity (Event 201)"
id: ceb66950-2882-408b-82d5-8c7e6cd0f22a
related:
  - id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23
    type: similar
  - id: 5d19eb78-5b5b-4ef2-a9f0-4bfa94d58a13
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies file transfer activity initiated or handled through ScreenConnect on Windows by matching an application event where the provider is ScreenConnect and the event indicates a file transfer action. Attackers can use ScreenConnect for stealthy remote administration, including moving files to support payload staging or data movement. Detection relies on Windows application telemetry containing the provider name and the specific event text indicating “Transferred files with action.”
references:
  - https://www.huntandhackett.com/blog/revil-the-usage-of-legitimate-remote-admin-tooling
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/screenconnect/win_app_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_file_transfer.yml
author: Ali Alwashali, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-10-10
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
  service: application
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name: ScreenConnect
    EventID: 201
    Data|contains: Transferred files with action
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate use of ScreenConnect
level: low
license: DRL-1.1

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