SharpImpersonation Tool Execution on Windows

Flags execution of SharpImpersonation.exe on Windows when command-line parameters indicate token impersonation activity.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-12-27
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1134.001Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1134.003Make and Impersonate Token
Defense Evasion
- T1134.001Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1134.003Make and Impersonate Token
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of the SharpImpersonation.exe binary by matching both the image path and the original filename. It further looks for command-line indicators associated with user, binary/shellcode fields, and techniques consistent with CreateProcessAsUserW and ImpersonateLoggedOnuser. Such tooling can be used to manipulate access tokens for remote or interactive impersonation, making process and command-line telemetry essential for detection.

Reporting behind it

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SharpImpersonation Tool Execution on Windows

Pivot detection · T1134.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

sharpimpersonation-tool-execution-on-windows-via-process-creation-f89b08d0

title: SharpImpersonation Tool Execution on Windows
id: ccef72f9-d1b6-4038-83ee-69751d748009
related:
  - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
    type: similar
  - id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of the SharpImpersonation.exe binary by matching both the image path and the original filename. It further looks for command-line indicators associated with user, binary/shellcode fields, and techniques consistent with CreateProcessAsUserW and ImpersonateLoggedOnuser. Such tooling can be used to manipulate access tokens for remote or interactive impersonation, making process and command-line telemetry essential for detection.
references:
  - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/
  - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_sharp_impersonation.yml
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1134.001
  - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \SharpImpersonation.exe
    - OriginalFileName: SharpImpersonation.exe
  selection_cli:
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
        - " user:"
        - " binary:"
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
        - " user:"
        - " shellcode:"
    - CommandLine|contains:
        - " technique:CreateProcessAsUserW"
        - " technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser"
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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