Windows SharpMove (.NET) Execution via SharpMove.exe and Action Command-Line Flags

Alerts on SharpMove.exe process execution with command-line actions for DCOM, WMI VBS, and task scheduler.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2024-01-29
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of SharpMove by matching SharpMove.exe in process creation events and requiring command-line activity consistent with the tool’s supported actions. SharpMove can perform multiple post-exploitation tasks, so catching its presence and action flags helps detect attacker-driven execution paths for lateral movement and remote management. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable image name/original file name and command-line parameters.

Reporting behind it

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Windows SharpMove (.NET) Execution via SharpMove.exe and Action Command-Line Flags

Pivot detection · T1021.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

sharpmove-exe-execution-on-windows-dcom-wmi-vbs-and-scheduled-task-actions-055fb54c

title: Windows SharpMove (.NET) Execution via SharpMove.exe and Action Command-Line Flags
id: 1b729a5c-4d74-4872-beea-46fa0c252dcc
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of SharpMove by matching SharpMove.exe in process creation events and requiring command-line activity consistent with the tool’s supported actions. SharpMove can perform multiple post-exploitation tasks, so catching its presence and action flags helps detect attacker-driven execution paths for lateral movement and remote management. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable image name/original file name and command-line parameters.
references:
  - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/
  - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_sharpmove.yml
author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-01-29
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \SharpMove.exe
    - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe
  selection_cli_computer:
    CommandLine|contains: computername=
  selection_cli_actions:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - action=create
      - action=dcom
      - action=executevbs
      - action=hijackdcom
      - action=modschtask
      - action=modsvc
      - action=query
      - action=scm
      - action=startservice
      - action=taskscheduler
  condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
    type: derived

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