SparkRAT Defender Exclusions for ctfmon and C Drivers (via registry_set)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-09
Updated
2026-11-09

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft Defender exclusions being written for ctfmon, VSSVC or the C Drivers directory, the defense-evasion step in the Cambodia-focused SparkRAT infection chain that shields its injection hosts and staging folder. Adversaries add these exclusions so their injected processes and payloads escape scanning. Exclusions covering injection-target processes and an unusual root directory are strong evasion signals.

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SparkRAT Defender Exclusions for ctfmon and C Drivers (via registry_set)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.