Suspicious 0ktapus Phishing Kit Credential Post Path Access

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-21
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects web requests to the /login/email and /login/identifier endpoints combined with the Poll.js resource which are DOM and URL fingerprints of the 0ktapus phishing kit that impersonates Okta and single sign-on portals. This is important because these paths are hardcoded artifacts of the kit used to harvest credentials and multi-factor codes so their presence in proxy logs indicates a user interacting with a 0ktapus phishing site.

Related detections9 linkedT1566.002 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Spoofed Inbound Email With Failed Authentication and Anonymous Internal Sender (via m365)
Suspicious Error 524 Decoy Smishing Phishing Endpoint Access (via proxy)
Suspicious Windows Script Host Execution of JavaScript from Temporary Archive Extraction Folder (via process_creation)
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Grant via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious OWA Proxy User-Agent Indicating Mailbox Access
Suspicious Anonymous Sharing Link Creation in SharePoint or OneDrive via M365 Audit
Suspicious Help Desk Impersonation via External Microsoft Teams Chat
Possible AnyDesk Execution from Non-Standard Directory (via process_creation)
Suspicious Screensaver File Executed as Installer via process_creation
Suspicious 0ktapus Phishing Kit Credential Post Path Access
Pivot detection · T1566.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.