Suspicious 0ktapus Phishing Kit Credential Post Path Access

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-21
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects web requests to the /login/email and /login/identifier endpoints combined with the Poll.js resource which are DOM and URL fingerprints of the 0ktapus phishing kit that impersonates Okta and single sign-on portals. This is important because these paths are hardcoded artifacts of the kit used to harvest credentials and multi-factor codes so their presence in proxy logs indicates a user interacting with a 0ktapus phishing site.

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Proxy requests to EvilTokens PhaaS phishing domains (Cloudflare Workers, Railway.app)
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Suspicious 0ktapus Phishing Kit Credential Post Path Access
Pivot detection · T1566.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.