huntrule

Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via AdsiSearcher

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
ps_script
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-05
Updated
2026-10-05
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell use of the AdsiSearcher type accelerator to query Active Directory, an enumeration step performed by the actors exploiting CVE-2026-1731. Directory searches map users and groups to plan privilege escalation and lateral movement. AdsiSearcher usage in scripts is uncommon outside of dedicated administrative tooling.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1087.002 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious ADFind Active Directory Reconnaissance Execution
Malicious IcedID AdFind Active Directory Reconnaissance via Command Line
Suspicious ADFind Active Directory Enumeration (via process_creation)
Suspicious SOAPHound Style LDAP Query with SDflags and all_with_list via security
Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security
Suspicious Active Directory Web Services Query from Localhost via SOAPHound
Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control
Suspicious LDAP Query Enumerating Kerberos Preauth Disabled Accounts with Whitespace Evasion
Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID
Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via AdsiSearcher
Pivot detection · T1087.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.