Suspicious AdInsight Execution from ProgramData via Scheduled Task by WikiLoader

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-14
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a renamed AdInsight executable running from the ProgramData directory, the persistence payload a scheduled task launches in the spoofed GlobalProtect WikiLoader campaign. A signed utility executed from a non-standard writable path indicates masquerading and sideloading rather than legitimate use. Detecting this exposes the persistence and execution stage of the loader.

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Suspicious AdInsight Execution from ProgramData via Scheduled Task by WikiLoader
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.