Suspicious AI CLI Invoked With Permission Bypass Flags (s1ngularity Aftermath)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the claude, gemini, or q AI command line tools launched with flags that bypass their safety prompts, the abuse pattern the s1ngularity payload used to enumerate and stage files for theft. It is important because coercing local AI assistants into fully automated file operations turns a developer tool into a reconnaissance engine.

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Suspicious AI CLI Invoked With Permission Bypass Flags (s1ngularity Aftermath)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.