Suspicious APT37 Run Key Persistence Masquerading as OneDrive Updater (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Priv Esc
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects APT37 adding a CurrentVersion Run value that references a tele_update executable staged in ProgramData while masquerading under an OneDrive updater name. This persistence pattern points to the FadeStealer component.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious SystemBC Persistence via Run Key to ProgramData Script

Suspicious APT37 Run Key Persistence Masquerading as OneDrive Updater (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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