Suspicious Archive Expansion into Public User Directory via PowerShell (via ps_script)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell Expand-Archive activity that extracts content into the C users Public directory, a world-writable staging location abused by the AsyncRAT infostealer chain. Combined with the BITS download of the original archive this reveals payload unpacking prior to execution. Legitimate software rarely unpacks archives into the Public profile.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Archive Expansion into Public User Directory via PowerShell (via ps_script)

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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