Suspicious AWS API Activity From S3 Browser Client User-Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-03
Updated
2026-11-03

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects CloudTrail events whose user agent identifies the S3 Browser desktop client which Wiz ties to cloud-fluent threat actors performing enumeration and object deletion after credential theft. This is important because production workloads rarely use the S3 Browser GUI so its appearance in CloudTrail is a reliable indicator that stolen keys are being operated from an attacker workstation.

Related detections9 linkedT1078.004 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Azure OpenAI Model Enumeration and Deployment Creation (via azure)
Suspicious S3 Access from Desktop File Transfer Clients by Bling Libra
GitHub Audit Log: Self-Hosted Runner Configuration Changes
Malicious Bapak AWS EKS CreateCluster With Known Cluster Name via CloudTrail
Malicious AWS IAM User Creation With Known Threat Actor Names
Suspicious AWS API Activity From WinSCP Client User-Agent
Suspicious EKS Access Entry Creation via CloudTrail
Suspicious Azure CLI Service Principal Login with Inline Secret
Suspicious AWS Console Login Without MFA
Suspicious AWS API Activity From S3 Browser Client User-Agent
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.