Suspicious AWS Login Profile Creation for Persistence

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a console login profile via the CreateLoginProfile API which grants interactive console access to an IAM user. It maps to credential-based persistence where an attacker adds a password to a programmatic service account. Detecting it can reveal backdoor console access being established.

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Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)
Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)
Suspicious AWS Login Profile Creation for Persistence
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.