Suspicious AWS Long-Term Access Key Creation for Persistence via CloudTrail (via aws)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-16
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the creation of a long-term IAM access key, which adversaries generate as a backup AKIA credential to maintain persistent access to a compromised AWS account per Red Canary. Key creation for a user other than the caller, or immediately following STS token abuse, is a strong indicator that an attacker is establishing durable persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Credential Addition to Entra Application via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious IAM Persistence and Privilege Escalation Actions
Suspicious MURKY PANDA Credential Addition to Entra ID Service Principal (via azure)
Suspicious IAM Access Key Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)
Suspicious AWS Administrator Policy Attachment via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious AWS Inline Policy Granting Full S3 Access
Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)
Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)
Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Suspicious AWS Long-Term Access Key Creation for Persistence via CloudTrail (via aws)
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.