Suspicious Azure AD Authentication Method Registration for Account Takeover (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registration or update of a security info authentication method in Azure AD Entra ID, the account-takeover step used by the Payroll Pirates after help-desk social engineering. Attackers add an attacker-controlled email or MFA device as an authentication method on service and employee accounts to seize persistent access and alter direct-deposit details.

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Suspicious Azure AD Authentication Method Registration for Account Takeover (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.