Suspicious Azure Instance Metadata Service Access (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata API
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a command-line query to the Azure Instance Metadata Service endpoint with the required Metadata header, a technique used in the ChaosDB walkthrough to harvest instance credentials. Attackers reach the link-local metadata address to obtain managed identity tokens. Because legitimate agents also query this endpoint the rule is heuristic and best paired with process context.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1552.005 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Cloud Instance Metadata Token Theft via IMDS Identity Endpoint (via process_creation)

Suspicious GCP Metadata Service Token Access via Command Line (via process_creation)

Suspicious Azure Instance Metadata Service Access (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1552.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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