Suspicious Azure OpenAI Model Enumeration and Deployment Creation (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
azure
Service
activitylogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Azure OpenAI Models_List and Deployments_Create operations that Red Canary described adversaries using to enumerate available models and stand up new deployments after obtaining access to a resource. Reconnaissance of models followed by deployment creation can indicate an actor preparing to abuse a victim Azure OpenAI service for inference at the owner expense.

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Suspicious Azure OpenAI Model Enumeration and Deployment Creation (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.