Suspicious Backgrounded Bash Payload via nohup On macOS

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-04
Updated
2026-10-04

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a bash payload launched detached from the terminal with nohup and backgrounded, matching the persistence behavior observed in the ClickFix infostealer chain on macOS. The Odyssey and ACR stealers use this pattern so their downloaded script keeps running after the fake verification window is closed. Detaching execution helps the operator survive the user closing the shell they were tricked into using.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.