Suspicious Backgrounded Bash Payload via nohup On macOS

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.004Unix Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a bash payload launched detached from the terminal with nohup and backgrounded, matching the persistence behavior observed in the ClickFix infostealer chain on macOS. The Odyssey and ACR stealers use this pattern so their downloaded script keeps running after the fake verification window is closed. Detaching execution helps the operator survive the user closing the shell they were tricked into using.

Reporting behind it

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Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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