Suspicious Batch Execution From Hidden __MACOSX Archive Path (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
- T1204.002Malicious File
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a command shell executing a batch file from a hidden __MACOSX directory extracted from a delivery archive, the initial execution step of this Cobalt Strike infection chain. Legitimate workflows do not run scripts from __MACOSX archive residue.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1204.002 — drag to rearrange

Malicious KB Document Masqueraded Executable Spawned by Script Interpreter via RoKRAT Loader (via process_creation)

Malicious SCMBanker ClickFix Payload Fetch via Curl Piped to Cmd

Malicious Script Execution from WinRAR Extraction Directory via CVE-2023-38831

Suspicious Foxit PDF Reader Spawning Command Interpreter

Windows AppLocker Audit-Mode Events Indicate Files Would Have Been Blocked

Windows AppLocker Blocked Application, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App Execution

Malicious IIS Worker Spawning nslookup via WS_FTP Deserialization

Suspicious Interlock Fake Updater Executable Execution

Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)

Suspicious Batch Execution From Hidden __MACOSX Archive Path (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

Full detection rule

Unlock this rule to view and copy it

The detection logic is included with a plan. Everything else — context, mappings and implementation details — stays free on this page.

Sign in for 3 free unlocks

Signing in gives you 3 unlocks to spend on any rule in the library. No card, and they do not expire.

Also included

Unlocked rules convert on this page — to Splunk SPL or Splunk — Raw Index SPL or Microsoft Sentinel KQL or Microsoft Sentinel ASIM ASIM KQL or Microsoft Defender XDR KQL or Elastic Security KQL or Elastic Security Lucene or Elastic Security ES|QL or CrowdStrike Falcon CQL or SentinelOne PowerQuery or Palo Alto Cortex XDR XQL or Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search or Carbon Black EDR Process Search or Google Security Operations UDM Search or IBM QRadar AQL or Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Rules expression or Rapid7 InsightIDR LEQL or Graylog Search or OpenSearch Lucene or OpenSearch PPL PPL or Grafana Loki LogQL or SQLite SQL or Zircolite SQLite — with the log-source profile the engine picked, the field map it used, and everything it could not express. Converting a rule you have unlocked costs no further credit.

See it run on a free rule →Convert your own rule →