Suspicious Bazar Network Reconnaissance Command Batch

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-04
Updated
2026-10-04

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the net.exe view-all-shares enumeration used in the Bazar and Cobalt Strike recon batch executed by Trickbot, Qbot and Hancitor crews after landing on a host. The operator sweeps for reachable systems and shares to select lateral-movement targets. Combined with adjacent systeminfo and whoami calls this pattern marks the start of hands-on-keyboard activity.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.