Suspicious BeaverTail Payload Drop of store.node and Hidden Loaders

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the BeaverTail dropped artifacts store.node and hidden .pyp or .npl loaders in the user profile, matching the North Korean job-hunter campaigns reported by Unit 42. These filenames staged in the profile root and dotted directories are markers of the BeaverTail infostealer and InvisibleFerret chain which precedes credential theft.

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Suspicious BeaverTail Payload Drop of store.node and Hidden Loaders
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.