Suspicious BoryptGrab Infostealer Staging Directory (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-06
Updated
2026-09-06

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of files within the Filegraber or decrypt_browser staging directories. The BoryptGrab-lineage infostealer wrote harvested browser data and logs to these folders, retaining the misspelled Filegraber directory name.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.