Suspicious Browser Login Data Copied to Temp File via type Command

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of the cmd type command to copy a browser Login Data credential store into a temporary file. In SocGholish activity the stolen store was redirected into a rad prefixed tmp file for later DPAPI decryption. Copying the credential database is a precursor to bulk password theft from the endpoint.

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Suspicious Browser Login Data Copied to Temp File via type Command
Pivot detection · T1555.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.