Suspicious Browser Updater Binary Spawned by AutoIt for Process Hollowing

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects legitimate browser updater executables such as GoogleUpdate, BraveUpdate, MicrosoftEdgeUpdate or ielowutil being launched by Autoit3.exe, the hollowing target pattern used by DarkGate to run injected code under a trusted signed process. Updaters are never started by the AutoIt interpreter in normal operation. Detecting the pairing exposes process hollowing into signed binaries.

Related detections9 linkedT1055.012 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing via Command Line
Suspicious Outbound Network Connection from msiexec.exe (via network_connection)
Suspicious Outbound Connection from tracerpt.exe after Process Hollowing (via network_connection)
Suspicious AddInProcess32 Outbound Connection after Process Hollowing
Suspicious microsoftedgeupdatecore Outbound Connection from Wrong Path
Suspicious RegAsm or AppLaunch Outbound Connection after Injection
Suspicious DotNet Utility MSBuild RegAsm RegSvcs Network Beacon Indicating Hollowing
Suspicious SearchProtocolHost Network Connection Indicating Process Hollowing
Suspicious Browser Updater Binary Spawned by AutoIt for Process Hollowing
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.