Suspicious BunnyLoader Keylog Capture File in AppData Temp (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-13
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of files matching the ADE_ prefix text file pattern in the local AppData Temp directory, the naming scheme BunnyLoader uses to stage captured keystrokes before exfiltration. Writing keylog output under this predictable path reflects the loader collection module in operation, marking active credential and data theft.

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Pivot detection · T1056.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.