Suspicious CAB Extraction via extrac32 LOLBin

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects extrac32 being used to extract cabinet archive contents, a living-off-the-land technique observed in a Lumma infostealer campaign that used extrac32 to unpack a CAB file masquerading as a document during payload staging. It captures abuse of a signed Windows utility to unpack malicious archives. Detecting this is important because extrac32 is rarely used interactively and its appearance in an attack chain often indicates covert payload deployment.

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Suspicious CAB Extraction via extrac32 LOLBin
Pivot detection · T1140 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.