Suspicious CAB Extraction via extrac32 LOLBin

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects extrac32 being used to extract cabinet archive contents, a living-off-the-land technique observed in a Lumma infostealer campaign that used extrac32 to unpack a CAB file masquerading as a document during payload staging. It captures abuse of a signed Windows utility to unpack malicious archives. Detecting this is important because extrac32 is rarely used interactively and its appearance in an attack chain often indicates covert payload deployment.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1140 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious File Concatenation via copy Binary Mode

Suspicious GPG Decryption of Downloaded Payload via GPG

Suspicious Shell Command Obfuscation via printf Escape Encoding on VMware ESXi (via process_creation)

Hidden PowerShell Archive Extraction via ExtractToDirectory

Malicious Shell Payload Piped from curl to zsh

CastleLoader ClickFix PowerShell Hex Decode and Re-Execution

Suspicious Cabinet Extraction of Masqueraded vstm Archive via extrac32

Suspicious tar Extraction of Staged Archive to Temp (via process_creation)

Malicious Multi Layer Base64 Decoded Payload Execution via Bash (via process_creation)

Suspicious CAB Extraction via extrac32 LOLBin

Pivot detection · T1140 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

Full detection rule

Unlock this rule to view and copy it

The detection logic is included with a plan. Everything else — context, mappings and implementation details — stays free on this page.

Sign in for 3 free unlocks

Signing in gives you 3 unlocks to spend on any rule in the library. No card, and they do not expire.

Also included

Unlocked rules convert on this page — to Splunk SPL or Splunk — Raw Index SPL or Microsoft Sentinel KQL or Microsoft Sentinel ASIM ASIM KQL or Microsoft Defender XDR KQL or Elastic Security KQL or Elastic Security Lucene or Elastic Security ES|QL or CrowdStrike Falcon CQL or SentinelOne PowerQuery or Palo Alto Cortex XDR XQL or Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search or Carbon Black EDR Process Search or Google Security Operations UDM Search or IBM QRadar AQL or Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Rules expression or Rapid7 InsightIDR LEQL or Graylog Search or OpenSearch Lucene or OpenSearch PPL PPL or Grafana Loki LogQL or SQLite SQL or Zircolite SQLite — with the log-source profile the engine picked, the field map it used, and everything it could not express. Converting a rule you have unlocked costs no further credit.

See it run on a free rule →Convert your own rule →