Suspicious ClickLock LaunchAgent Persistence Plist Creation (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the com.authirity or com.chromer LaunchAgent property lists that ClickLock macOS stealer drops for RunAtLoad persistence. The misspelled and lookalike labels masquerade as legitimate system or browser agents while ensuring the stealer relaunches. Detecting these plists exposes ClickLock persistence.

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Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.