Suspicious Cloudflare Quick Tunnel Used for Covert Access (via dns_query)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS resolution of trycloudflare.com quick tunnel subdomains used in the TeamPCP supply chain attack to expose internal services and route command and control through Cloudflare infrastructure. Ephemeral tunnel domains provide attacker-controlled ingress that bypasses perimeter controls, so such lookups from servers warrant investigation.

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Suspicious FRP Proxy Download via wget to Temporary Directory (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Cloudflare Quick Tunnel Used for Covert Access (via dns_query)
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.